

Developments which have been little commented on but which are bound to have lasting consequences have taken place in the USSR beneath the more obvious events.

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN WAR-TIME USSR

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IN order to comprehend the changes in the population and economics of the USSR during the war years of 1941 to 1945, it is necessary briefly to review the changes in these fields which took place in the twenty-four years of Bolshevik rule preceding the war. They are characterized by four main facts:

(I) LOSSES IN POPULATION

According to official Soviet statistics, the population of what is now the Soviet Union decreased from 1917 to 1922 by 10 million (from 141.7 to 131.7 million). Furthermore, Soviet statistics assumed a population figure of 180.7 million for January 1938, while the census of January 1939 showed it to be 170.5 million. The difference of 10.2 million corresponds more or less to the effects of the famine of 1933/34, which was never admitted officially. If we take into account the fact that, during these two periods of 1917/22 and 1933/34, in addition to the actual decrease in the population the normal increase of 2 to 3 million a year was also nullified, we arrive at the conclusion that, as a result of excessive mortality and the decreased birth rate during the Revolution, the Civil War, the famine of 1921/22, the collectivization, and the famine of 1933/34, the population inhabiting the soil of the present Soviet Union suffered a loss of altogether some 25 to 30 million people.

(II) URBANIZATION

Owing in part to the forced industrialization, in part to the mass migration from the rural districts which suffered particularly from the famines, an exceedingly rapid process of urbanization took place in the Soviet Union. While the urban population of the USSR was almost tripled from 1920 to 1939, rising from 19.4 to 55.5 million, the rural population remained practically unchanged; it increased by only 2 per cent (from 112.2 to 114.5 million). Indeed, in comparison to 1929, when the rural population reached its highest figure of 126.7 million, it even declined by 12.2 million.

(III) SLIGHTLY SHIFTING CENTER OF GRAVITY

Assuming the population figure for each of the various regions of the USSR to have been

100 in 1920, we arrive, according to Soviet statistics, at the following index figures for the growth of the population:

Territory	Population Index			
	1920	1926	1933	1939
European Soviet Union				
Forest zone	100	121	147	140
Black Earth zone (mainly the Ukraine)	100	106	112	117
Northern Caucasus	100	104	115	121
Transcaucasia	100	113	137	155
Turkestan	100	110	134	158
Western Siberia (incl. Kazakstan and Kirghiz Rep.)	100	112	122	120
Eastern Siberia	100	123	170	216
Far East (incl. Yakut Rep.)	100	114	115	144
Soviet Union total:	100	112	126	130

This table shows that three territories (Black Earth zone, Northern Caucasus, Western Siberia) are considerably *below* the average rate of increase, while four territories (Transcaucasia, Turkestan, Eastern Siberia, Soviet Far East) are far *above* the average of the USSR. The proportion of the European Soviet Union in the population of the entire Soviet Union has declined from 78 per cent (1920) to 76 per cent (1939); that of the non-European Soviet Union has risen from 22 per cent (1920) to 24 per cent (1939). Deducting the natural increase, we can assume that in the years between 1920 and 1939 some 2½ million people from the European Soviet Union were resettled in the non-European areas. As a large proportion of this figure is made up of deported persons, the eastern migration of the population, seen on the whole, was not nearly as great as was generally assumed. The industrial development of Siberia during the thirties must therefore have been effected mainly with the aid of the native population.

(IV) MELTING POT

The effect of the changes in the population structure discussed under (I) to (III) varied in the different parts of the Soviet Union. The greatest loss in population was suffered by the main grain-producing areas—Black Earth zone, Northern Caucasus, Western Siberia—because the struggle first for Bolshevization, then for collectivization, assumed a particularly violent form here. Kazakhstan suffered a similar loss

as a result of the Bolshevik policy of denationalization, which had a disastrous effect upon cattle stocks and consequently upon the population. To speak in racial instead of geographical terms: Ukrainians, Volga-Ural Tartars, and Kazaks, i.e., non-Russian elements, were particularly badly hit.

Urbanization also had a denationalizing effect on the non-Russian components of the population, as those Ukrainians and Kazaks who migrated from their native villages into the cities fell victim far more rapidly to the general leveling process than those who remained in the villages.

The shifting of the center of gravity toward the east also tended to decrease the national minorities just named. Among them the resistance against Bolshevism was particularly vehement; and among the Ukrainians and Volga-Germans, for instance, the number of so-called *kulaks* deported to Siberia was especially great. Their actual loss was even greater than is revealed by the statistics; for in these the full extent of the decrease is partially hidden by the strong immigration of other, mostly Russian elements into these areas. In order to influence and educate these minorities in the Bolshevik sense, it proved necessary to send millions of Party functionaries, Comsomol executives, *kolkhoz* chiefs, administration officials, etc., there, who helped at least partially to fill the gaps. The extraordinarily high rates of growth in Transcaucasia, Turkestan, Eastern Siberia, and the Soviet Far East—all regions also inhabited by national minorities—are not the result of a natural increase. If they were, these peoples would be miracles of propagation; the Turkestans would, for example, have increased by 4 per cent every year from 1933 to 1939, while the average annual increase for the whole Soviet Union during the same years amounted to only 0.67 per cent. No, the unusual population growth in these territories is, above all, the result of a considerable immigration of workmen, technical personnel, and engineers from other parts to foster the industrialization of these formerly backward regions.

We have no exact figures concerning the movement of population within the various nationalities in the immigration areas. But assuming that the native population of Turkestan has increased at the same rate as that of the whole of the Soviet Union, i.e., by 0.67 per cent per annum, the natural increase in the period from 1933 to 1939 would have amounted to 0.227 million. Since, however, the actual increase in that period was 1.36 million, we must conclude that the difference of some 1.133 million migrated there from other parts. So we find the same phenomenon in all non-Russian territories with a particularly low as well as a particularly high increase in population: a permeation of native with immigrant elements.

SINCE THE START OF THE WAR

How was the population trend of the USSR influenced by the present war? Here we have above all the gigantic process of evacuation, which took place in the course of the war in four waves of varying extent.

(1) *After the occupation of eastern Poland.* The first wave occurred after the occupation of eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939. It will probably never be known how many civilian inhabitants of these areas were sent off to the interior of the USSR. Even the Anglo-Saxon press reckons with 1½ to 2½ million. A large—perhaps the largest—proportion of them was settled in the Altai, on the Siberian-Chinese border, and various stations such as Novosibirsk and Tashkent still broadcast Polish programs.

(2) *During the retreat of the Red Army.* The next wave began in the summer and autumn of 1941, in part owing to the flight of the population but chiefly owing to systematic evacuations combined with a ruthless scorched-earth policy. To a varying degree it affected all territories occupied by the German troops up to the late autumn of 1942: the Ukrainian areas with some 46 million inhabitants (including some 36 million Ukrainians); the entire White Ruthenian territory with some 9 million people (including some 6 million White Ruthenians); the mixed Ukrainian-Russian territory of the Northern Caucasus and the lower Volga areas with some 12 million people (including some 4 million Ukrainians); and part of the Russian territory in the central and northern USSR with some 7 million inhabitants.

As far as can be ascertained, the White Ruthenian and Russian territories were less affected by the evacuations. From an economic point of view they played a minor role; their occupation could not provide the Germans with any great advantages, burdening them instead with the responsibility for feeding the population; the national consciousness of the White Ruthenians was not strongly enough developed to give the Soviets any cause to fear a serious separatistic movement; that of the Russians, on the other hand, was strong enough to limit the danger of their co-operating with the Germans; finally, the wooded and marshy area was well suited for partisan activities. Among the people evacuated from White Ruthenia the proportion of Jews—of whom a great number lived there—was probably large.

The situation in the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus was different. Experience has led Moscow to feel skeptical about the political reliability of their population; moreover, these regions contained the richest agricultural and industrial areas of the Union. Hence it was important to remove as many people—workers as well as peasants—and as many industrial plants as possible before the German advance. Some time ago *Izvestiya* wrote about "those

days when the inhabitants of the Ukrainian villages and towns moved eastward in a ceaseless stream . . . driving cattle and horses before them and intent upon leaving nothing behind" (20.6.44). It can probably be reckoned that, seen on the whole, these territories—the western parts less than the eastern—lost some 20 per cent of their population as a result of evacuations during the first year of war. Since a large proportion had, moreover, been called up to the army, we can assume that the total number evacuated from German-occupied territory was 12 million—9½ million Ukrainians, 2 million Russians, the rest Jews, White Ruthenians, etc.

(3) *During the German occupation.* Up to the summer of 1943, when the German troops began their large-scale withdrawal from the Soviet Union, there were, according to German assertions, among the then 7 million foreign workers in Germany, some 2 million workers from the Soviet Union, mostly Ukrainians—not counting the millions of prisoners of war.

(4) *During the German withdrawal.* When the German troops evacuated from the Soviet Union (summer 1942 to autumn 1944), a large part of the population went with them. There are no exact figures available. But since the total number of foreign workers in Germany rose during this period to more than 12 million and the main proportion of the increase came from the east, we may assume that the population evacuated to the west during the German withdrawal, including children, amounted to some 7 million people.

As a consequence of all four evacuation waves, the population of the German-occupied territories has thus lost some 21 million, including some 17 million Ukrainians and 3 million Russians. Again it was, as in the prewar period, the Ukraine which was most badly hit. When the Red Army marched in again in 1943/44, the population of the Ukraine can have amounted to no more than 50 to 60 per cent of the prewar population, and probably no more than 15 per cent of the men between the ages of 16 and 40.

The Soviet press is full of examples which go to show that our calculation for the evacuation losses is rather too low than too high:

"We have been flying more than half an hour without seeing a soul. When we landed we could not find anybody to show us the way. . . . The countryside has been turned into a desert," we read in an article in *Pravda* (11.2.44) about conditions in the province of Kiev. According to Soviet statements, more than 100,000 people have moved away from each of the cities of Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk as well as from the Crimea in the period lying between the withdrawal and the return of the Red Army (*Pravda*, 3.12.43, 25.5.44; *Izvestiya*, 25.3.44). The province of Chernigov has "lost several hundred thousand people" (*Komsomol-*

skaya Pravda, 16.4.44). As for the situation in the province of Kharkov, *Izvestiya* wrote (19.3.44): "There are hardly any people to do the work in the villages. Indeed, where should the labor come from, since only old men, invalids, women, and children are left?"

WHERE DID THEY GO?

In order to understand the Soviet situation, it is of the utmost importance to know where the Soviets have evacuated these 12 million people. As the German front was pushed furthest east on the southern sector, as well as from various other indications, we must assume that the great majority of the people evacuated from the northern and central parts were allowed to settle in the provinces immediately to the east of those parts. On the other hand, the Soviet press contains many indications to the effect that the population evacuated from the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus was sent to territories behind the Volga, indeed, behind the Urals. If we take into account that some remained in the European Soviet Union, while others fell victim to the hardships of the evacuation or were later mobilized for the Red Army, we arrive at the conclusion that in 1941/42 some 7 million people, including some 6 million Ukrainians, streamed into the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union.

If we remember that the total number of people resettled in the Asiatic Soviet Union by the Bolsheviks up to 1941 amounted to only some 2½ million, we understand the import of the sudden influx of 7 million new people. To give an example: the changes wrought in Kazakhstan alone are probably somewhat as follows. Instead of the 3.6 million Kazaks, not quite 2 million Russians, and 0.5 million Ukrainians inhabiting it before the war, there are now 3.6 million Kazaks and about 2 million Russians and 2 million Ukrainians living there. In this way, the Kazak territory, which was populated almost solely by Kazaks before the Bolshevik Revolution, has itself become a melting pot in which the Kazaks only represent a minority.

"DESERTERS"

The reader might say that this presentation of the evacuations is merely of academic interest, since they are obviously measures caused by the war and it is to be assumed that everything will return to normal after the war. The opposite, however, is the case. There is enough material to prove that the Soviet Government regards the evacuations not as a temporary measure but as one which is to remain in force during the postwar period. As long as the native regions of the evacuees were occupied by the Germans, the Soviet Government did not have to give voice to its intentions on this point. But as province after province came under Soviet control again, an increasing urge

to return home made itself felt among the millions of evacuees, and on September 7, 1944, the central organ of the Party, *Pravda*, had to state in its editorial (and its editorials are as good as laws):

Enterprises with a considerable number of workers, engineers, and technicians have been evacuated into the Urals, to Siberia, and Central Asia. These enterprises will remain there. The people have gone there not for a day and not for a year. The desire of the people of Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Donbass, Kharkov and Odessa, to return to their native cities is natural. But the interests of the socialist state demand the maintenance of the evacuated enterprises in the East.

This is plain speaking, and although this article seems only to mention industrial workers there can be hardly any doubt that the ban on re-evacuation also applies to the peasant population. There is no need for it to mention them specifically, as many of them are also employed in one way or another in industrial work. There are no indications anywhere in the Soviet press to show that any evacuated peasants are returning from the Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union in numbers worth mentioning.

Stalin apparently intends to reconstruct the reoccupied territories without the participation of the people evacuated from them. That this cannot be carried out by the people who have remained—mostly women, children, and old men—was already mentioned. So the fact that the evacuated population is not being allowed to return can only mean that the Party intends to fill up the existing gaps with people imported from regions of other nationality, perhaps from newly occupied territories.

ONE MORE EVACUATION

Side by side with the evacuation caused by the German advance, a second one took place in territories not touched by the war. There are numerous indications to be found in the Soviet press and radio to the effect that growing numbers of people of Turko-Tatar and Central Asiatic origin are being employed in the industries of the Urals and Siberia. The radio stations of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok so frequently mention the presence of Tartar, Kazak, Tajik, and Uzbek workers in the Soviet Far East that there must be large groups there. "In many enterprises of the Central Territory, in the Urals, and in Siberia there are now Kazaks, Tajiks, and Uzbeks working," writes *Trud*, the organ of the Central Trade Union Council in a leading article (8.6.44). The Party organs are asked to devote special attention to them, and complaints have been raised regarding the fact "that the majority of them do not speak Russian."

This second process of evacuation, which was not caused by the war, resulted in the Tartar and Central Asiatic Soviet Republics being gradually stripped of natives. In the Khirgiz Republic there were, according to *Pravda* (18.9.

44), only 252 native Khirgizes among the 6,028 pupils who finished middle school during the last four years. In Tajikistan the non-Tajik population increased to such an extent that it became necessary to publish several new newspapers in Russian (7.10.44); while in some of the industries of Stalinabad, the capital of Tajikistan, "only a few Tajiks are to be found among the workers" (12.10.44).

So we see that, while members of Central Asiatic tribes are working in the oil fields of Sakhalin and on the roads of northeastern Siberia, the industrial development of Central Asia itself is being carried on largely with the aid of nonnative workers. A comparison of the various reports dealing with this subject leads us to assume that about 500,000 people were evacuated from the European Soviet Union to Turkestan and that approximately the same number of Tartars, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kazaks, etc. were sent from their homes to the industries of other regions during the war.

DENATIONALIZATION

The melting-pot nature of the Bolshevik population policy manifest during the period from 1917 to 1941 has therefore been greatly emphasized during the war. Moscow is obviously determined to bring the process of mixing the nations and denationalizing them—which reached its first climax in the industrialization and forced collectivization of the thirties—to completion by the evacuation and resettlement policy of the forties, and in particular to settle the Ukrainian problem once and for all in this way. Once the Ukrainian problem could be solved in the Bolshevik sense, all other national problems within the Soviet Union would lose much of their political significance. The liquidation of this problem within the Soviet borders must be specially important to Stalin at a time when the Soviet Union is bringing large additional territories with scores of millions of non-Russian inhabitants under its control, thereby evoking numerous new nationality problems. The measures of the Soviet Government, especially the ban on re-evacuation, indicate Moscow's desire to fix things in such a way that after the war there will be no territory in which the native inhabitants—the Ukrainians in the Ukraine, the Kazaks in Kazakhstan—form a majority. They may also mean that Stalin intends to employ mass-evacuations as a means of dealing with the nationality problems in the newly conquered areas.

OPPOSITION

The fact that Moscow is forced to carry out such extensive measures affecting the lives of millions of people is a clear indirect proof of the strength of the national resistance of non-Russian peoples to Russian Bolshevism. But there are also direct proofs of this. We could

fill pages with quotations from Soviet newspapers or radio lectures which go to show how strong the resistance is with which the Bolsheviks have met in the reoccupied areas, particularly in the Ukraine and White Ruthenia. At first they only vented their wrath against "agents" allegedly left behind by the Germans to stir up trouble; but soon they had to admit that the trouble was caused by the population itself.

In an article "On the Propaganda Work in the Liberated Areas," *Propagandist* (1944, No. 14, p. 2) demands intensive political mass work in the reconquered areas "because their population, living as it did for a long time under the conditions of German occupation, received no genuine Soviet information, and the enemy tried with the aid of his propaganda to poison the minds of the Soviet people." The article admits that it is not easy to carry out this task. There is, it complains, a lack of capable agitators—in the provinces of Odessa and Kiev, there were only 58 at work instead of the 430 originally provided for—and, moreover, among the agitators themselves "a harmful simplification and confusion in the explanation of essential problems" could be observed.

On September 12, 1944, Colonel General of Justice Ulrich demanded "incessant watchfulness in the liberated areas" over the Moscow radio. An editorial in *Pravda* (7.10.44) called attention to the "disposition toward private property and against the government" which the Germans had instilled into the hearts of the population of the occupied territories. On October 29, 1944, *Trud* wrote: "Not for a single instant must we forget that workers and working women are participating in the reconstruction of factories and mines who had remained behind in the territories temporarily occupied by the enemy. The German occupation forces have sown a disposition for private property there." And on December 19, 1944, Colonel General Ulrich spoke again over all the broadcasting stations of the Soviet Union:

"We must reckon with spies and saboteurs in all branches of the state apparatus. They may be in the Army, at the front, in the plants, in the government offices, villages, towns, in the fields, in the houses, in short: everywhere. In the Ukraine there are the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] bands. They call themselves Ukrainian nationalists. We call them Ukrainian-German nationalists. They undertake all kinds of conspiratorial work. They are dangerous."

Even the latest newspapers to have arrived from Moscow contain frequent mention of the Ukrainian nationalists and their anti-Soviet activities. We cannot but ask: if Moscow is having so much trouble with a population consisting mainly of women, children, and old men, which lived for about two years under German occupation and has been under Soviet rule again for a year or more, what must the

feelings of the Bolshevik leaders be in looking forward to the return of millions of people who have for years been living on German soil and working in German plants in daily contact with the German people?

CHANGES IN INDUSTRY

The implications of the population changes during the war become even clearer when we consider some of the most important changes in the structure of Soviet economics. For, in addition to the millions of people, thousands of machines were evacuated eastward. And, like the people, the evacuated factories are also to remain in the East after the war. Moreover, the specific gravity of these eastern regions has been increased not only as a direct result of the evacuation of people and machinery but also because the evacuations and the huge demands of the war necessitated a rapid expansion of the economics of those parts. A plan recently drawn up for Eastern Siberia provides for 200 expeditions to be sent out within the next three years to make an exact geological survey. In addition to the existing and evacuated factories, many new plants have been founded. In Soviet Central Asia the proportion of heavy industry in the total industry has risen from 14.3 per cent (1940) to almost 50 per cent (1944); and in Turkestan the proportion of industrial production in total production, including agriculture, rose from 28 per cent (1925) to 76 per cent in 1944 (*Izvestiya*, 20.2.44, and *Novaya Jisn*, 24.12.44).

How dependent the old industrial regions have become on the new ones is shown by the following assertion: "The old industrial region [in the western parts of the Soviet Union] will be reconstructed on the basis of the eastern regions, which have been considerably developed by the evacuated plants" (*Bolshevik*, 1944, No. 19/20, p. 32). The reconquest of the western territories will for the time being not alter the fact that the Soviet Union's economic center of gravity has been shifted almost a thousand miles toward the east.

REGIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Simultaneously with this process of a general shifting of the center of gravity toward the east, another development took place. During the first two decades of Bolshevik rule, one of the principles of their planned economy was a far-reaching horizontal distribution of work. For this purpose, the entire Soviet Union was at that time looked upon as a single uniform economic sphere. Each region and, within each region, each plant was supposed to specialize. During the last few years, however, this policy proved to be a dangerous one, for it requires a smoothly functioning system of transportation as well as a well-adjusted interplay of all branches of economy. Both were disrupted by the war. Furthermore, the decentralization of

industry—which was formerly concentrated in comparatively small parts of the European Soviet Union and is now distributed over the entire Union, particularly its Asiatic part—has had a disorganizing effect. Countless bottlenecks were created by nonforthcoming deliveries of machine parts. Even the manufacture of the simplest things was decentralized; and if something was forgotten, it could not be obtained because of lacking local facilities:

For some time, the ax has been having bad luck in our industry. The People's Commissariats for iron metallurgy, machine building, airplane building, armament manufacture, tank manufacture—they all run away from the ax. "It does not belong to our department," they say. At the same time, all these People's Commissariats without exception fill out reams of paper every month and every quarter and waste the energies of the supply departments to squeeze out axes for their urgent requirements. (*Pravda*, 5.10.44)

No wonder that the readjustment of the principal industrial areas to regional self-sufficiency is now being demanded, and that even individual enterprises are being urged to do everything possible to cover their own requirements. So the horizontal structure is to be replaced by a vertical one, which the Soviets, in order to avoid using the word "autarchy," have given the nice new name of "universalism." The same applies to the consumer-goods industry as well as to the numerous small industrial plants producing certain spare parts or simple implements for large enterprises and which are now being oriented toward the individual economic regions rather than the market of the entire Union (*Izvestiya*, 26.10 and 28.11.44).

Even in the field of agriculture and food supply this trend toward regional autarchy is making itself felt. Owing to the loss of the rich Black Earth zone and the shortage in means of transportation, the Soviet Government has since the spring of 1942 been constantly urging the industrial plants to make themselves self-sufficient as far as possible with regard to the obtaining of food supplies. Three years ago this magazine ("The USSR Faces Spring," May 1942) drew attention to the early stages of this trend. In the meantime the "auxiliary farms" have grown to 50,000; this has, of course, the disadvantage that the industrial workers have to spend more time at agricultural work. The metal workers of the Kuzbass, the large industrial basin in central Siberia, recently declared that by means of these auxiliary farms they were able to cover all their requirements in potatoes and vegetables. In addition to this, workers' families are being urged to cultivate small vegetable gardens (called *ogorody*) on their own. At present there are said to be some 16 million of these *ogorody*.

EGOTISTIC KOLKHOZES

During and after the Revolution, the village soviets (village councils), i.e., the lowest ad-

ministrative units, formed the main instrument of the Bolshevik peasant policy. Later, particularly during the war years, the village soviets were completely overshadowed by the *kolkhozes* (collective farms), of which there are usually several within the area of a village soviet; the Government, urgently in need of bread, went over the heads of the village soviets and applied directly to the *kolkhozes*. In the ten years of their existence the *kolkhozes* had consolidated themselves; and in economic as well as political respects the importance of the *kolkhoz* chiefs waxed, while the deputies of the village soviet had less and less to do and say. It was particularly the Government organ *Izvestiya* which frequently drew attention to this fact. It wrote that "during the war years the contact between the deputies and the voters has been disturbed" (27.12.44), or complained that the heads of the county soviets often did not even know the names of the heads of the village soviets (20.10.44), that the heads of many village soviets had neither paper nor writing material (30.6.44), and that there was so little interest for their work that only third- or fourth-rate people were prepared to accept posts in them. And all this in spite of the fact that, according to Article 3 of the Constitution, "all the power in the USSR belongs to the workers in the towns and in the country in the person of the soviet deputies."

So the "dialectics of development" forced the Party for economic reasons to carry out measures which had grave political consequences. The *kolkhozes* developed into communities which placed the requirements of their own members above the interests of the state and began to show a tendency toward leading their own political life. More and more complaints were to be heard about the "*kolkhozes*' traitorous tendencies"; the latter found expression in the attitude of numerous *kolkhozes* which sought by every possible means, including sheer fraud, to circumvent the compulsory delivery of grain, or neglected to fulfill other demands of the Government in order to protect their own members.

Consequently, an increase in the authority of the village soviets has since last autumn been one of the main features of internal political interest in the USSR. It is being demanded in numerous articles and radio speeches. The President of the Soviet Union, Kalinin, declared that the independence of the *kolkhozes* must be limited to economic questions and that all political-administrative questions concerned only the village soviets, which should immediately be reorganized in such a way as to enable them to control even the smallest details of peasant life. It remains to be seen to what extent these measures will reverse the advanced process of acquiring independence on the part of the *kolkhozes*.

"MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION"

In one more respect a development toward local self-sufficiency can be observed: the growing independence of individual plants with regard to management, labor questions, wages, etc. An article in *Pravda* (5.6.44) demands an expansion of the rights of the factory head. For the sake of greater efficiency and working discipline, the manager is in future to be allowed to fix the number, position, and salary of the workers and employees of his plant and is to be given the right to dismiss workers without consulting the supervising authorities.

In his well-known book *The Managerial Revolution*, James Burnham wrote three years ago that the world was progressing toward a "revolution of the managers." He outlined the work of the manager as follows:

The diverse tasks of the technical direction and co-ordination of the process of production must be organized, co-ordinated, so that the different materials, tools, machines, plants, workers are all available at the proper place and moment and in the proper numbers. This task of direction and co-ordination is itself a highly specialized function.

It is not only in economic but also in political respects that the future belongs to the managers, thinks Burnham. And a kindred idea is expressed by *Pravda* when it writes (5.7.44): "The interests of our state demand that the head of a factory should become a real socialist master [*khozain*] of his enterprise." It is interesting that these utterly uncommunistic ideas, besides being expressed in the columns of the central organ of the Communist Party, are being pushed by the Soviet managers themselves who, probably without exception, are members of the Party.

The result of all these developments in Soviet economics is a double trend toward self-sufficiency. The first tends toward self-sufficiency of the individual plant, *kolkhoz*, manager, or even worker; the second—and this is particularly important for the understanding of the greater issues—toward the self-sufficiency of various large economic spheres. Those mentioned again and again in Soviet literature—in industrial as well as agricultural respects—are the Urals, Western Siberia/Altai, Kazakstan, Turkestan, and Eastern Siberia.

BACK-DOOR NEIGHBORS

One consequence of the eastward shift of the center of gravity is extremely interesting for its future implications: the effect it is having on the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. History has shown in general that the further apart two nations are, the more friendly do they feel toward each other. Even before the present alliance between Washington and Moscow, it has been pointed out in American literature and many a speech that America and Russia could easily co-ordinate their world

policies, as their territories lay far apart and their interests hardly collided from a geographical point of view. And it was praised as a great blessing that the Russians had sold Alaska to the USA and had thereby withdrawn from the American continent. As a result the USA and the USSR were separated until recently on the one side by the Atlantic and on the other by the Pacific.

The fact that the American and Asiatic continents almost touch in the North Pacific was of no account as long as northeastern Siberia between the Lena River and the Bering Strait, an area larger than Western and Central Europe put together, consisted of frozen wastes in which no one lived but some primitive natives and a handful of Russian officials and fur hunters. Today, however, the scene has undergone a radical change. A development initiated in the early thirties has been tremendously speeded up during the war and in connection with the mass evacuations: the opening up of northeastern Siberia, which the Bolsheviks call their Far North. Hitherto this development was hidden behind a veil of military secrecy, but quite recently various details have been published in the Soviet press and over the radio which permit us to gain some idea of what has been happening there.

FAR NORTH

Magadan (shown in the map of Siberia printed in *The XXth Century* of January 1944), the largest and most important settlement of the Far North, is not to be found even on new Soviet maps. The town is situated on the Nogayevo Bay—about 150° eastern longitude—which forms the best harbor on the Sea of Okhotsk. Since there is not yet any overland connection suited for large transports, Magadan, which is connected by ship with the Amur region, forms the gateway to the Far North. It is here that the "Kolyma Highway" starts, which crosses the high coastal range and follows the valley of the Kolyma River to Ambarchik, at the mouth of the Kolyma on the Arctic Ocean; this highway represents the vital artery of the Far North. A travel report published not long ago in *Izvestiya* (10. and 13.9.44) tells us that road houses or settlements have been built every twenty to thirty kilometers along the highway and describes some of the larger settlements which have developed on the mineral resources of the Kolyma region. The author reports that piles of rubble from the mines line both sides of the highway for miles on end. The center of the new mining area is Orotukan, where a steel works has recently been opened and where machine parts for the mining industry are produced in order to save the long, cumbersome transportation from the western parts of the Soviet Union. Electro-technical workshops in Atka supply the Far North with electric motors and transformers.

There are automobile workshops in Magadan.

The nonnative population is increasing rapidly probably due to compulsory evacuations from the west. Not many Soviet citizens would move to the Far North on their own initiative; it is among the coldest regions of the earth, wrapped for many months in polar night, and whipped by arctic snowstorms. The food problem is particularly difficult. In 1940 almost all food, some 40,000 tons, had still to be imported. Meanwhile, the population has grown, while the food and transport situation of the rest of the Soviet Union has been strained to the utmost. Hence, whether they liked it or not, the inhabitants of the Far North had to start their own agriculture, in view of the climate a very thankless task. Two feet under the surface, the earth is frozen summer and winter, and the farming season is limited to the short summer which, although intense, is interrupted by occasional night frosts.

No one doubts that the Soviets will keep on with their development of the Far North even after the war. America is now confronted with an entirely new situation: the vacuum lying between her and the Soviet Union has been filled with energy. Men like Wendell Willkie and Henry Wallace have had an opportunity to find this out for themselves during their journeys through Eastern Siberia. The man in the street in America has, of course, not yet become aware of this change. The people in Alaska were the first to grow alarmed, and we can be sure that the rapid opening up of Alaska during the last few years was, in part at least, a reply to the developments in the Soviet Far North. America has even offered the Finns the chance of settling in Alaska. Perhaps she believes that the Finns, who have for so long proved themselves as sturdy guards on the western border of Russia, might be able to undertake this job on the easternmost border of Stalin's empire too, in which America is much more interested. Of course, the Finns would have to consider whether it would be worth their while to move to the other side of the world. If the Russians lay historical claim to Finland, they can do it equally well to Alaska; for, while Finland was under Tsarist rule for 108 years, Alaska was under Russian control for 127 years (1740-1867).

CONCLUSION

The demographic and economic developments which we have discussed in this article have without doubt aided the Soviets in carrying on the war; but have they brought them any closer to the solution of their actual national and economic problems?

(1) We have seen how strong the anti-Bolshevist sentiment still is among the non-Russian nationalities. If, according to their own testimony, the Soviets are having so much trouble with the Ukrainians who are still in the

Ukraine, it is not likely that those who have been evacuated to Siberia have, through this additional hardship, grown more pro-Bolshevik. To be sure, in the Ukraine itself there are far fewer Ukrainians today than some years ago; but their numbers have increased in the other parts of the country, and they have carried their sentiments toward Bolshevism with them. Throughout the Bolshevik period it was shown time and again that the Russians are by far the most reliable element from the Bolshevik point of view; but the percentage of Russians in the population of the Asiatic part of the USSR has decreased. The following table, which lays no claim to complete accuracy but gives an approximate idea, shows this:

Composition of the Population of the Asiatic Soviet Union (excluding Transcaucasia)

	in per cent		
	Russians	Ukrainians	Others
1940	50	10	40
1945*	35	25	40

*after deducting mobilization

From the pages of the Soviet press we learn that, the smaller the percentage of Russians, the greater are the Bolsheviks' troubles. Among the regions mentioned most frequently as being politically unreliable and economically inefficient, we find more often than not territories with a strong non-Russian population and such as have been flooded with evacuees—the Bashkir and Tartar Republics, Western Siberia, Kazakstan, Central Asia. And it is an interesting fact that the troubles the Bolsheviks are having with the *kolkhozes* and soviets are also particularly acute in these areas.

(2) In the economic sphere we have found a trend toward regional and local selfsufficiency. The territory behind the Urals as a whole as well as some of its individual parts have during the last few years become largely self-sufficient in economics and preponderantly non-Russian in population. These territories have great prospects of economic development and represent entities of their own. At present this may be of no importance; but nothing is permanent, and new situations will arise in which the vast increase in non-Russian and less-Bolshevist population and the growing regional selfsufficiency of certain parts of the USSR may attain far-reaching importance.

The Bolsheviks love the "dialectics of development." They are always eager to convince themselves and others of how the laws of dialectics are working in their favor. But these laws were not written in the Kremlin. They have a logic of their own, and it is due to them that what the Bolsheviks have undertaken during the war to strengthen their economic and political position also contains dangers for themselves. To understand the present situation and future trends of the USSR one must know not only the Bolshevik theses but also the antitheses advanced by the historical process.